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Work Organisation and Workforce Vulnerability  
to Non-Employment: Evidence from OECD’s Survey  
on Adult Skills (PIAAC)1 
 
Nathalie Greenan, Ekaterina Kalugina, Mouhamadou Moustapha Niang 
 
Abstract 
This working paper examines the relationship between forms of work organisation and 
vulnerability of the workforce to non-employment. It relies on the data from the first two 
rounds of the survey on adult skills (PIAAC) carried out by the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 33 of its member or partner countries. Using 
hierarchical cluster analysis, we identify five forms of work organisation based on the 
description given by employees of the tasks they perform: Discretionary learning, 
Constrained learning, Independent, Simple and Taylorist. A multilevel logistic regression is 
then used to evaluate their impact on vulnerability to non-employment. Vulnerability to non-
employment is defined as the probability to make a transition from employment to non-
employment over a one year period. The results show indeed a significant impact of forms of 
work organisation on vulnerability to non-employment after controlling for a large number 
of relevant job and personal characteristics. In particular, employees in Discretionary 
learning forms of work organisation are the least vulnerable. We also identify labour market 
policies and institutions which are likely to influence the probability of making a transition to 
non-employment in relation with the different forms of work organisation. Our results 
suggest that active labour market policies such as training and employment and start-up 
incentives amplify the protective effect of Discretionary learning and Independent forms of 
work organisation as do passive labour market policies for Constrained learning and Simple 
forms of work organisation. To protect employees in Taylorist forms, expenditures on public 
employment service and administration, sheltered and supported employment and 
rehabilitation and direct job creation are to be promoted. A strict employment legislation 
against dismissals, unlike the strictness of the regulation regarding the use of temporary 
contract, tends to protect employees in Taylorist forms of work organisation while weakening 
the protective effect of Simple and Constrained learning forms. Finally, there is a non-
monotonous relationship between the centralisation of wage bargaining and vulnerability. 
Vulnerability is lower for employees in Constrained learning, Discretionary learning and 
Independent forms of work organisation when bargaining takes place at an intermediate 
level, while it is higher for employees in Simple and Taylorist forms and decreasing in the 
degree of centralisation. It would seem, therefore, that the effectiveness of labor market 
policies and institutions should be examined in relation with the forms of work organisation 
prevailing within each country. 
Keywords: Workforce vulnerability, Job insecurity, Work organisation, Labour market policies and 
institutions, PIAAC. 
1 This working paper is part of the InGRID project which has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh 
Programme for Research, Technical Development and Demonstration under Grant Agreement No 312691. 
 
 
                                              
 
ORGANISATION DU TRAVAIL ET VULNÉRABILITÉ AU NON-EMPLOI : 
UNE ÉTUDE EMPIRIQUE À PARTIR DE L’ÉVALUATION  
DES COMPÉTENCES DES ADULTES DE L’OCDE (PIAAC) 
 
RÉSUMÉ 
Bousculée par la crise et les mutations du tissu économique, la vie des organisations au sein 
des pays de l’OCDE a été marquée cette dernière décennie par des changements fréquents en 
lien avec les évolutions technologiques, tandis que se développaient aussi bien le non-emploi 
que les formes non conventionnelles d’emploi. Dans un tel environnement, la capacité des 
salariés à se maintenir en emploi ne dépend pas seulement de leurs caractéristiques 
individuelles. Les formes d’organisation du travail, dans lesquelles ils sont insérés et 
accumulent de l’expérience, jouent également un rôle fondamental. Or, la plupart des études 
concernant la vulnérabilité sur le marché du travail s’intéressent aux facteurs du côté de 
l’offre de travail plutôt qu’à ceux qui prennent leur source au sein des organisations. De 
l’autre côté, les études qui s’intéressent aux organisations du travail analysent les enjeux de 
productivité, d’innovation, de conditions de travail et de bien-être des salariés, mais abordent 
rarement ceux liés aux transitions sur le marché du travail.  
Ce document de travail examine la relation entre les formes d’organisation du travail et 
la vulnérabilité de la main-d’œuvre au non-emploi. La vulnérabilité au non-emploi est 
définie comme la probabilité d’effectuer une transition de l’emploi vers le non-emploi 
au cours d’une période d’un an. Il s’appuie sur les données des deux premières vagues de 
l’évaluation des compétences des adultes, pilotée par l’OCDE auprès de trente-trois de ses 
pays membres ou partenaires.  
En utilisant une classification ascendante hiérarchique, nous identifions cinq formes 
d’organisation du travail en fonction des tâches effectuées par les salariés sur leur lieu de 
travail : apprentissage autonome, apprentissage contraint, indépendante, simple et 
taylorienne. L’apprentissage autonome décrit des formes d’organisation où les salariés 
bénéficient de marges de manœuvre importantes pour accomplir leurs tâches. Ils participent 
aussi fréquemment à des activités leur permettant d’apprendre des échanges avec leurs 
collègues et de résoudre des problèmes complexes. Les salariés dans des formes 
d’organisation à apprentissage contraint sont moins autonomes que le groupe précédent, 
mais ils sont plus impliqués dans des activités d’apprentissage sur le lieu de travail que ceux 
des trois autres formes d’organisation. Dans les formes d’organisation du travail 
indépendantes les salariés disposent d’une très grande autonomie, mais ils sont moins 
souvent impliqués dans des activités collectives. Les salariés des formes d’organisation dites 
simples ont peu de marge de manœuvre, ils sont moins impliqués dans les échanges avec 
d’autres et ils ont peu d’opportunités d’apprentissage. La forme taylorienne est comparable à 
la forme simple, mais les salariés sont dans des organisations plus structurées, notamment ils 
sont amenés à se coordonner avec leurs collègues. 
Une modélisation logistique multiniveaux est ensuite utilisée pour évaluer l’impact de ces 
formes d’organisation du travail sur la vulnérabilité des salariés au non-emploi.  
Les résultats montrent un impact significatif de l’organisation du travail sur la 
vulnérabilité au non-emploi, après avoir tenu compte d’un vaste ensemble de caractéristiques 
des emplois et des individus. En particulier, les salariés dans des formes d’organisation à 
apprentissage autonome sont nettement moins vulnérables au non-emploi.  
Nous avons aussi identifié les politiques et institutions du marché du travail pouvant 
influencer la probabilité d’effectuer une transition vers le non-emploi en lien avec les 
différentes formes d’organisation du travail. Nos résultats suggèrent que les politiques 
actives, telles que la formation et l’incitation au maintien de l’emploi ou à la création 
d’emploi ou de start-up, amplifient l’effet protecteur des formes d’organisation à 
apprentissage autonome et indépendantes, tout comme les politiques dites passives pour 
les formes d’organisation à apprentissage contraint et simples. Pour protéger les salariés dans 
des formes d’organisation taylorienne, les dépenses en administration et service public de 
l’emploi, ainsi qu’en emplois aidés et en création d’emplois directs sont à privilégier. Un 
encadrement légal strict des licenciements, contrairement à une législation stricte sur 
l’utilisation des contrats temporaires, contribue à protéger les salariés dans des 
organisations tayloriennes, mais affaiblit l’effet protecteur des formes d’organisation à 
apprentissage contraint et simples.  
Enfin, nous avons trouvé une relation non monotone entre le degré de centralisation des 
négociations salariales et la vulnérabilité au non-emploi. Pour les salariés dans les formes 
d’organisation à apprentissage autonome, apprentissage contraint et indépendantes, la 
vulnérabilité des salariés est moindre pour un niveau de centralisation intermédiaire, alors 
qu’elle est accrue pour les organisations simples et tayloriennes et qu’elle se réduit avec le 
degré de centralisation. Il semblerait donc que l’efficacité de la politique et des institutions 
du marché du travail doive être examinée en lien avec les formes d’organisation du 
travail dominantes au sein de chaque pays. 
Mots-clefs : vulnérabilité au non-emploi, insécurité de l’emploi, organisation du travail, politiques du 
marché du travail, institutions du marché du travail, PIAAC. 
 

 
INTRODUCTION 
Organisational restructuring has been widely observed in workplaces since the 1980s 
(Osterman, 1994; Caroli and Van Reenen, 2001; Greenan, 2003). These changes often 
pursue an objective of productivity growth and innovation in an attempt to restore or 
strengthen competitivity for business survival in the face of a more and more competitive 
international economy. Indeed, work organisation is often considered as a central element 
in fostering economic and business development in this new world. For example, 
Eurofound (2009) argues that more decentralised and empowering forms of work 
organisation are associated with a better quality of work and employment and that their 
promotion may help attaining the objectives set by Europe 2020 strategy and the New Skills 
for New Jobs initiative. However, from the employees’ perspective, while these forms of 
work organisation may contribute to increased job satisfaction ‒ through more autonomy 
and task complexity ‒ they may also generate increased stress, work pressure and work 
intensity.  
In this paper, we are going to study an area of impact of forms of work organisation which 
has seldom been considered: vulnerability to non-employment. It is defined as the 
probability to make a transition from employment to non-employment over a one year 
period. Indeed, we argue that employees’ ability to secure their employment in changing 
work environments is partly due to the form of work organisation in which they are 
employed, either because it makes the organisation more resilient to business shocks or 
because it allows employees to better develop their skills and to adjust them to business 
needs. The acceptability for social partners of policies implemented to improve 
competitivity depends on this relationship on which little is known. As a matter of fact, 
most studies on labour market vulnerability address supply side factors expected to 
influence labour market participation or the intensity of job search rather than demand side 
factors like working conditions or work organisation characteristics. Besides, the former 
are much better documented than the latter in labour force surveys. In this regard, the 
purpose of the present paper is to provide some insights into the linkage between forms of 
work organisation and vulnerability to non-employment within a number of countries that 
took part into rounds 1 and 2 of the survey of adult skills carried out by the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in the context of the Programme for 
the International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC). 
Different strands of literature relate work organisation with economic outcomes. In the 
High-Performance Work Systems (HPWS) literature a distinction between the hierarchical 
and flexible forms of work organisation is made, assessing the impact of different 
organisational practices and work arrangements on efficiency improvements in production 
processes (Ichniowski et al., 1997; Osterman, 1994; Gittleman et al., 1998; Wood, 1999; 
Ramsay et al., 2000; Truss, 2001). The consequences of the diffusion of the Japanese lean 
production model associated with Toyota has also been scrutinised in this research field 
(Womack, Jone and Roos, 1990; MacDuffie and Pil, 1997). The literature on organisational 
design explores the relationship between work organisation and innovation and provides a 
more complex typology of forms of work organisation, notably the distinction between 
different adhocratic work systems based on learning, problem solving and discretion (Burns 
and Stalker, 1961; Mintzberg, 1979, 1983; Lam, 2005; Lam and Lundvall, 2006; Lorenz 
and Lundvall, 2010). Finally, in the literature on job quality, the emphasis is mostly on the 
contrasted effects of the forms of work organisation on different aspects of working 
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conditions (Karasek, 1979; Clark, 2005; and Green et al., 2015). Many dimensions of new 
forms of work organisation lead to increased job satisfaction and well-being, but some 
critical aspects like work intensity, lack of job control or poor physical work environment 
are sources of negative employee outcomes like stress, health impairments or work 
accidents. 
The effects of work organisation on labour market outcomes are barely covered in these 
research strands except for wage rates. The job quality literature considers however the 
effects of job insecurity on workers’ job satisfaction, on their well-being or their health 
(Esser and Olsen, 2011; De Witte, 2005; Green, 2015). The few studies which examine the 
determinants of job insecurity do not look at organisational aspects of work (Green et al., 
2000). Furthermore, while these studies approach the question of job insecurity using 
subjective measures of the concept, the present study proposes an objective one, exploiting 
the information given in the PIAAC survey regarding the employment history of 
employees. 
Finally, there is a rich literature on the effects of labour market policies and institutions on 
aggregate unemployment or on flows out of unemployment (Scarpetta, 1996; Nickell, 1997, 
1998; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Belot and Van Ours, 2001; Nickell, Nunziata and Ochel, 
2005). In the current paper, we argue that these national labour market characteristics may also 
influence transitions from employment to non-employment and this impact may vary 
according to the form of work organisation experienced by employees. 
We use hierarchical cluster analysis to define five forms of work organisation: 
Discretionary learning, Constrained learning, Independent, Simple and Taylorist. The 
clustering is based on the description given by employees of the tasks they perform. A 
multilevel logistic regression is then used to evaluate their impact on vulnerability to non-
employment, controlling for relevant job and personal characteristics as well a for national 
labour market policies and institutions.  
The paper is organised as follows. The next two sections explain the measurement frame of 
vulnerability to non-employment (section 1) and of the different forms of work 
organisation (section 2). Then section 3 presents the model and the variables used in our 
econometric analysis. Section 4 presents the empirical results before we conclude in 
section 5. 
1. MEASURING VULNERABILITY TO NON-EMPLOYMENT 
Several aspects of workforce vulnerability are described in the literature. It can be defined in 
terms of lack of employment security, low level of earnings or exposure to professional risks 
(Weil, 2009). In this paper, we focus on workforce vulnerability on the labour market2, 
which is close to job insecurity. Employment security is an important aspect of the quality of 
a job and a source of job satisfaction (Gallie, 2003; Green, 2006; Doellgast et al., 2009). Job 
insecurity is usually defined objectively or in a subjective way. 
The subjective definition refers mainly to the perceived fear of losing one’s job (Anderson 
and Pontusson, 2007; De Witte, 2005; Esser and Olsen, 2011), or, more recently, to the fear 
of facing a downgraded job status, such as being transferred to a less interesting or less 
2 The concept of labour market vulnerability is quite large. It could include workers unable to access their statutory rights 
or lacking access to social protection (Saunders, 20003). Standard (full-time, indefinite) but low-paid work is also one of 
the forms of the labour market vulnerability. These kinds of vulnerabilities are out of the paper’s scope. 
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challenging post with the same employer or losing a valued feature of the job (Gallie et al., 
2017; Green, 2015). As it refers to the subjective fear of losing one’s job or one’s job status, 
it is dependent on individual interpretations. The same objective situation could provoke 
feelings of insecurity for some even if, objectively, their job continuity is not affected and 
vice versa (De Witte, 2005). Many studies found, however, a link between the sujective job 
insecurity and individual’s objective chances and position on the labour market (Clark and 
Postel-Vinay, 2009; De Witte, 2005). 
While subjective job insecurity is about the future, objective job insecurity refers to the 
precariousness of the current employment relationship: part-time, temporary work, 
employment through temporary agency and self-employment (Saunders, 2003). Indeed, these 
non standard employment characteristics are often associated with poor income and working 
conditions as well as with a greater exposure to economic risks. Temporary and part-time 
work have been on the rise in industrial countries since the late 1970s. Globalisation, 
technological change, as well as changes in patterns of family and working life are usually 
mentioned as the main explanations of such trends. However, not all precarious workers are 
vulnerable at every point of time. A dynamic perspective is usually necessary in order to 
better appraise the degree of individual objective vulnerability. A temporary contract, for 
example, could be a bridge to a job with higher quality, but also a trap into precarious, low 
quality, short-term jobs. The interaction with the level and duration of unemployment or 
inactivity is thus important. Vulnerable groups, such as young people, women, and low 
skilled workers, are often characterised by high incidence of unemployment rates as well as 
greater duration of unemployment spells. 
Hence labour market vulnerability is also addressed through the analysis of worker flows 
among different labour market states: employment, unemployment, inactivity. After defining 
the transition rates (for example, employment-employment, employment-unemployment, 
employment-inactivity), the Markov transitions chains and Markov matrices are used for the 
descriptive analysis while regression analysis is usually applied in order to study the impact 
of main individual and institutional determinants of labour market transitions. From the 
theoretical standpoint search and matching models are referred to (Pissarides, 2000; Cahuc 
and Zylberberg, 2004). Two main data sources are generally used in this lierature: the Labour 
Force Survey (LFS) and the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions 
(EU-SILC). These databases allow defining different labour market transitions due to the 
panel data module and the detailed description of behaviours on the labour market. Based on 
this data, the European Commission (2014) provides in-depth analysis of labour market 
transitions in the European Union before and during the economic downturn which started in 
2008. Compared with 2006, employment stability has declined significantly in 2010, with 
unemployment becoming the most frequent destination upon leaving employment. During 
this period, the transitions of men and young people were most strongly affected and 
temporary employment did not act any longer as a bridge to permanent employment 
(European Commission, 2014, p. 4). 
Our measure of labour market vulnerability is based on an objective definition, namely the 
probability to make a transition from employment to non-employment over a one year 
period. Hence employees are considered as vulnerable when they cannot secure their 
employment in the near future. We choose this definition because we want to explore the 
sources of labour market vulnerability which are related to working conditions and 
employment history. Workers in employment are more vulnerable to non-employment 
when they are not able to develop their skills in order to adapt to technological and 
organisational changes in the workplace and maintain their employability or when their 
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working conditions do not allow them to remain in employment when they face personal 
challenges like family responsibility or health problems. Vulnerability to non-employment 
is also higher when the workplaces encounter problems that put their survival in jeopardy. 
For instance, when they are hit by an economic downturn or when they are not able to 
renew their strategy when new challengers enter their markets. This focus on employment 
history complements the perspective developped in the literature on unemployment history 
(Disney, 1979; Andress, 1989; Gay, 1989; Steiner, 1989; Stern, 1989; Winter-Ebmer and 
Zweimüller, 1992; Arulampalam et al., 2001; Niang, 2014) where recurrent unemployment 
is considered as part of the cycle of labour market disadvantage and poverty in work.  
If EU-LFS and EU-SILC collect detailed information on employment status, transitions and 
socio-demographic characteristics, they do not describe, except for specific modules, the 
working conditions of people in employment. This is why we prefer to use another 
household data source, the OECD’s survey of adult skills (PIAAC). While there are no 
questions about fear of job loss in the survey of adult skills, vulnerability in terms of 
objective employment security can be measured. The first and second rounds of the survey 
cover thirty-three countries member or partner of OECD. It gathers information on adults’ 
skills proficiency and how those skills are used in the workplace and other environments, in 
addition to personal and job characteristics. Around 250,000 adult persons aged 16 to 65 
were surveyed during the two rounds in the national languages of the thirty-three 
participating countries. The data collection took place between August 2011 and March 
2012 for the first round and between April 2014 and March 2015 for the second round. 
As the data for Australia and Indonesia are not available in the combined Public Use File 
(PUF), thirty-one countries are used in the descriptive part of our papier (sections 1 and 2). 
Due to missing data in Austria, Canada and United States of America3, we will ultimately 
use the data from twenty-eight countries in the econometric part of our study (sections 3 
and 4): Belgium (Flanders), Chile, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Lithuania, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, Turkey and United Kingdom (England and Northern Ireland).  
This survey is very appropriate for the implementation of the measure of vulnerability to 
non-employment presented above as it offers a unique retrospective view into the 
employees’ employment situation over a year. We consider only individuals who are 
working or have worked in the last twelve months previous the survey. Those among them 
non-employed at the time of the survey, unless they are retired, are considered as 
vulnerable to non-employment compared to those who were able to keep their jobs. The 
resulting variable is our binary dependent variable. The original dataset has 
200,588 observations, of which we keep only those individuals who declared having 
worked a paid job in the last twelve months preceding the survey (145,814). They represent 
roughly 72% of the initial number of observations in the survey as shown in Table 1 which 
synthesise the different steps in the construction of our vulnerability index. 
We remove from the sample young persons aged 16-24 in their initial cycle of studies, who 
amount to 13,216 persons. Among the remaining 132,598 individuals, we keep only 
employees. This leaves us with a sample of 112,845 individuals of whom 9,657 (9.27%) are 
3 For these three countries, information was not given regarding the employment history of individuals. The type of 
employment contract was also not available for Canada and the United States. Information regarding the gender was 
unavailable for Austria, as well as information on the number of hours worked per week. The latter is also not available 
for Canada.  
10 
                                              
Work Organisation and Workforce Vulnerability to Non-Employment: Evidence from OECD’s Survey on Adult Skills  
non-employed at the time of the survey for diverse reasons: end of temporary contract 
(23.9%), dismissals (10.4%), redundancy (9.5%), family responsibilities or child care 
(8.6%), study (3.8%), bad health (8%), resignation (6.4%), retirement at or after state 
pension age (5.8%), early retirement (2.8%), others (18.9%). We remove from the sample 
the persons retired at or after state pension and consider all the remaining individuals as 
being vulnerable to non-employment. They represent 8.8% of the considered population. 
Table 1. Sample and vulnerability index 
 
Source: First and second rounds PIAAC(2012 and 2015), OECD. 
 
  
Variable
Adults who have had paid work during the last 12 months 145814 72.0
Adults who have not had paid work during the last 12 months 51931 26.2
Not known 2843 1.8
Total 200588 100
Eligible forAdult Education/Training population (AET) 132598 92.1
youths 16-24 in initial cycle of studies 13216 7.9
Total 145814 100
Employee 112845 84.7
Self-employed 18667 14.3
Not known 1086 1.0
Total 132598 100
Employed 103188 90.7
Non-employed 9657 9.3
Total 112845 100
Could you tell me the main reason you stopped working
Not known 83 1.9
I was dismissed 900 10.4
I was made redundant or took voluntary redundancy 1249 9.5
It was a temporary job which came to an end 2568 23.9
I resigned 757 6.4
I gave up work for health reasons 722 8.0
I took early retirement 362 2.8
I retired (at or after State Pension age) 580 5.8
I gave up work because of family responsibilities or child care 690 8.6
I gave up work in order to study 439 3.8
I left for some other reason 1307 18.9
Total 9657 100
Non-vulnerable 103188 91.2
Vulnerable 9657-580=9077 8.8
Total 112265 100
Frequency
Weighted 
percentage
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Figure 1 presents, for each country, our vulnerability rate as well as the unemployment rate 
calculated using PIAAC4 and the OECD unemployment rate based on the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) definition. Our vulnerability measure differs from the 
unemployment rate in many regards. The unemployment rate is calculated at a given point in 
time and considers the proportion of the active labour force without a paid work while the 
rate of vulnerability considers loosely the rate of job loss over a period of time. Therefore, it 
considers only those who have worked in the last twelve months. 
Figure 1. Vulnerability to non-employment and unemployment rate 
 
Sources: First and second rounds PIAAC, weighted statistics, OECD database, 2012 and 2015. 
 
The rate of unemployment is higher when the rate of job losses is higher even though all 
individuals leaving employment do not become unemployed. Indeed, leaving employment, 
individuals may transit toward inactivity. While the unemployment rate concerns individuals 
who are ready to return to work within two weeks, our measure of vulnerability includes 
those who do not qualify as unemployed for the many reasons given in Table 1. For instance, 
some people give up work, and for some of them, they do so in order to study. These persons 
are not considered as unemployed, while the training they receive is a concrete means of 
finding a new job. Others give up work for family responsibilities, for health reasons or for 
an early retirement. These people have been discouraged to remain in employment, although 
they could have remained employed with appropriate working conditions. Thus, the 
unemployment rate does not take into account all vulnerable persons on the labour market. 
On the other hand, the working age population who were unemployed or inactive during the 
previous twelve months is not taken into account in our indicator even though this population 
is certainly vulnerable in terms of income and well-being. 
4 PIAAC unemployed is any person aged over 16 years old who is currently not employed, who has looked for a paid 
work at any time in the last 4 weeks, who has taken active steps to find a job and upon finding a job would have been 
able to start within 2 weeks or any person who will start a job within 3 months but is available to start a job within 
2 weeks.  
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Spain is the country where all three measures of labour market vulnerability are the highest. 
Overall, the unemployment rate is greater than our vulnerability rate and this is also observed 
in fifteen countries out of twenty-eight. The thirteen remaining countries are Russia, Turkey, 
New Zealand, Israel, Singapore, Chile, Korea, Japan, the Nordic countries, the Netherlands 
and Austria. In these countries, exit from the labour force is more frequent for employees 
who have not been able to secure their jobs. 
In what follows, we are going to analyse these differences using multilevel modelling with a 
particular attention to the influence of the form of work organisation and to its interaction 
with labour market institutions. 
2. MEASURING FORMS OF WORK ORGANISATION 
Work organisation is a multidimensional concept. Eurofound’s European Observatory of 
Working life (EurWORK) defines it as follows: “How work is planned, organised and 
managed – via production processes, job design, task allocation, rules, procedures, 
communication, responsibilities, management and supervisory styles, work scheduling, work 
pace, career development, decision-making processes, interpersonal and interdepartmental 
relationships.”5 
Accordingly, work organisation is a latent variable that can only be measured consistently 
with a set of questions. Data analysis is generally used to identify specific configurations of 
responses within this set, allowing to derive a taxonomy of organisational forms which 
mapping across countries can be analysed. The current study builds upon Lorenz and Valeyre 
(2005) and Arundel et al. (2007) who propose a mapping of forms of work organisation using 
the European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS). The survey of adult skills cover a larger 
set of countries, but it is less informative in terms of the variables needed for the 
measurement of work organisation. Both data sources are cross-sectional but PIAAC is a 
household survey when the EWCS covers people in employment only. Therefore, only 
subjective job insecurity or non-standard employment can be measured through the EWCS. 
Furthermore, compared with the two studies cited above, we apply hierarchical cluster 
analysis to the survey variables rather than to the scores of a factor analysis6, but the 
clustering is made using the same Ward’s minimum variance hierarchical clustering method. 
Interviewed employees in PIAAC are asked to describe the task they perform because it is 
considered as an indirect and objective measure of their use of skills in the workplace. These 
questions also capture some of the dimensions of work organisation. We select those that are 
available both for the current job and for the last job when the person is not currently 
employed7. They cover the following dimensions: 
5 Retrieved from: https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/fr/observatories/eurwork/about-eurwork/work-organisation 
6 This choice is motivated first by the fact that we do not have that many variables, whereas the main reason factor 
analysis is used is to reduce the number of variables. Second, using the raw variables makes the interpretation easier than 
when using factor scores. In such a case, we have to interpret the result of the clustering based on the interpretation we 
have given to the results of the factor analysis. A third reason is related to the nature of our variables. They are ranked 
from the lowest frequency of skill use (never) to the highest (daily). Therefore the higher the frequency at which the task 
is performed, the higher the value assigned. This makes their assimilation to numerical variables acceptable, at least for a 
hierarchical cluster analysis.  
7 There are some additional questions on work organisation in PIAAC’s background questionnaire, but we cannot use 
them as they are only asked for the current job. This is the case for a set of questions on autonomy (D_Q11a, D_Q11b, 
D_Q11c, D_Q11d) and on informal learning (D_Q13a, D_Q13b, D-Q13c). 
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- Discretion/autonomy in the job: how often the worker plans his/her own activities, 
organises his/her own time. 
- Collaboration in the workplace, team work: how often the worker shares work-related 
information with a co-worker, cooperates with co-workers. 
- Influence in the workplace: how often the worker persuades or influences other people 
in the workplace.  
- Problem solving: how often the worker solves complex problems at work ‒ requiring 
more than thirty minutes to find a solution. 
- Formalisation: how often the worker uses his/her literacy skills at work to read 
directions and instructions. 
- Learning through on-the-job training: whether the worker has the possibility through 
his job to improve his/her abilities and/or acquire new skills. 
Except for on-the-job training, each of these variables is rated as follows, depending on how 
often the task is performed: 1 never, 2 less than once a month, 3 less than once a week but at 
least once a month, 4 at least once a week but not every day, 5 every day. On-the-job training 
is a dummy variable indicating participation in organised sessions for on-the-job training by 
supervisors or co-workers. We use Ward’s hierarchical clustering method to define a 
taxonomy of five forms of work organisation8 based on these variables: Discretionary 
learning, Constrained learning, Independent, Simple and Taylorist. Table 2 gives the mean 
value for each of the variables according to the form of the work organisation. The last 
column of the table (overall) contains the mean of variables in the overall population 
regardless of the form of work organisation. For each form of work organisation and for each 
variable, a test of equality with the overall mean was performed.  
Table 2. Characteristics of the different forms of work organisation 
  
Source: First and second rounds PIAAC (2012 and 2015), OECD, weighted statistics. 
Coverage: These calculations include all participating countries and take into consideration those who have worked a 
paid job as employees during the last 12 months preceding the survey, excluding youths aged 16-24 in initial cycle of 
studies and retired people at State pension age. 
Notes: Bold figures are significantly greater than the overall average, otherwise significantly lower. 
8 The choice of the number of clusters has been made following Ward’s minimum variance hierarchical clustering. A 
histogram of information losses resulting from regrouping clusters of the last merging steps of the hierarchy as well as a 
dendogram to search for distinctive breaks (elbow) guides the choice of cluster numbers. We retained a parcimonious 
number of clusters after a thorough review based on their mapping across countries. Individuals for whom some of the 
variables used in the clustering are missing are assigned afterwards to the classes they are the closest based on available 
information, maximising the interclass variance and minimising the intraclass variance.  
Discretionary 
learning
Constrained 
learning
Independent Simple Taylorism Overall
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean
Planning own activities 4.63 1.71 4.69 2.61 1.63 3.58
Organising own time 4.77 4.62 4.78 3.03 1.22 3.95
Solving complex problems 3.77 2.50 2.70 1.94 2.10 2.84
Sharing work-related information 4.70 4.64 4.49 1.68 4.63 4.20
Cooperating or collaborating 3.77 3.77 3.36 1.89 4.07 3.45
Persuading or influencing people 4.25 2.49 2.78 1.72 2.12 2.99
Read directions or instructions 4.31 3.43 2.94 2.14 2.88 3.33
On-the -job training 0.76 0.45 0.08 0.13 0.29 0.39
Overall 33.96 10.47 25.57 14.02 15.98 100
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The bold figures indicate that the mean of the variable is significantly higher than the overall 
mean. The non-bold figures indicate a lower mean value than the overall mean. For instance, 
in terms of how often employees solve complex problems at work, employees working in a 
Discretionary learning form of work organisation have a mean value of 3.77, which means 
(rounding up) that they perform this activity every week, while an average employee in the 
overall population performs it only monthly, with a mean of 2.84.The bottom line of Table 2 
shows the distribution of the different forms of work organisation in the overall population, 
which is representative of employees who have worked a paid job in the last twelve months 
and are neither in the initial cycle of studies nor retired. 
The Discretionary learning form account for roughly 34% of this population. It is 
characterised by the more frequent performance of all the tasks identified to map work 
organisation than in the overall population and in the other forms of work organisation, 
except in rare few cases. In this form of work organisation employees have a higher degree 
of autonomy in the way they do their job. They plan their own activities and organise their 
own time on a daily basis. They are also more frequently involved in solving complex 
problems at work: at least once a week, compared to once a month in the average population. 
Except for the Taylorist form of work organisation, they are more involved in team work 
than employees in the other forms of work organisation. As a matter of fact, they share work 
related information on a daily basis and cooperate or collaborate with co-workers at least 
every week. They are also more involved in taking initiative as they persuade or influence 
people at work on a weekly basis. They read directions or instructions at least every week. 
Finally, they are more involved in learning activities. Nearly 80% of them receive on-the-job 
training. This form of work organisation resembles the one of the same name in Arundel et 
al. (2007) and the operating adhocracy in Lam (2005). 
The clustering identifies another learning form of work organisation referred to as 
Constrained learning because more constraints weigh on the organisation of work. Unlike in 
the Discretionary learning form of work organisation, employees in the Constrained 
learning form experience below average frequencies for planning their own activities (less 
than once a month), solving complex problems (less than once a week, but at least once a 
month) and persuading or influencing people (less than once a week but at least once a 
month). However, they organise their own time weekly, share work-related information 
daily, cooperate or collaborate with co-workers weekly, read directions or instructions 
weekly and 45 % of them are involved in on-the-job training. So, this form of work 
organisation differs from the Discretionary learning in term of discretion, problem solving 
and influence at work, but employees have more learning opportunities than in other forms of 
work organisation through collaborations and sharing of information as well as through on-
the-job training. 
The Independent form of work organisation is below the overall mean for the following 
activities: reading directions or instructions, on-the-job training, solving complex problem, 
cooperating or collaborating with co-workers and persuading or influencing people at work. 
They perform these activities less than once a week, but at least once a month. They are 
situated above the overall mean for the other variables. They plan their own activities and 
organise their own time daily; they share work-related information daily. This form of work 
organisation differs from the Discretionary learning form in terms of formalisation of work, 
team work, problem solving and learning opportunities. Employees in this form of 
organisation have a lot of discretion and many opportunities to exchange with other people in 
professional networks but their organisation is more informal. 
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The Simple form of work organisation is opposite to the Discretionary learning form as 
employees perform less frequently than in the average population all the listed tasks. Thus, 
they perform more simple jobs in simpler organisations. However, in this form of work 
organisation, 13% of employees receive on the job training, which is more than in the 
Independent form. 
The last form of work organisation is Taylorism. It is is characterised by below average 
frequency for all listed tasks except for two of them: cooperating or collaborating and sharing 
work-related information. 29% of employees in this form receive on-the-job training, which 
is more than in the Independent and Simple forms, but less than in the Learning forms of 
work organisation. Thus, employees perform simple tasks in more structured organisations 
than in the Simple form. This is why we identify this last form as the Taylorist form of work 
organisation. 
Figure 2. National differences in forms of work organisation 
 
Source: First and second rounds PIAAC (2012 and 2015), OECD, weighted statistics. 
Coverage: These calculations include all participating countries and take into consideration those who have worked a 
paid job as employees during the last 12 months preceding the survey, excluding youths aged 16-24 in initial cycle of 
studies and retired people at State pension age. 
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Figure 2 gives the mapping of these five organisational forms in countries covered in 
rounds 1 and 2 of PIAAC. The Discretionary learning model is more frequent in Anglo-
saxon and Nordic countries as well as in the Netherlands: more than 40% of the covered 
employees are concerned in these countries. The Contrained learning model represents more 
than 13% of the workforce in Slovenia (13%), Japan (15%) and Germany (23%). The 
countries with the higher shares of Independent forms (37% and more) are Sweden, Italy, 
Estonia, Lithuania, Norway and France. The four countries with the top share of Simple 
forms are Turkey (30%), Russia (28%), Korea (25%) and Lithuania. For the Taylorist form, 
Slovenia (30%), Slovakia (26%), Greece (22%) and Austria (21%) are ranking the highest. 
We can distinguish at least six clusters of countries according to the observed mix of forms 
of work organisation. In a first group, composed of Denmark, Finland, New Zealand and the 
United Kingdom, the Discretionary learning forms of work organisation are more 
widespread when all the other forms are less so. A second cluster is characterised by more 
prevalent Discretionary learning or Constrained learning forms while the spread of 
Independent forms is limited: USA, Canada, Ireland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Israel, 
Singapour and Chile are in this group. Germany and Slovenia come together, with a high 
share of Constrained learning form and more prevailing Taylorist forms. Two nordic 
countries (Norway, Sweden) and three eastern and central European countries (Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Poland) are characterised by more frequent Independent forms, with 
Discretionary learning forms close to average and less widespread other forms. In a fifth 
cluster mediterranean countries (Cyprus, Spain, France, Greece and Italy) come together with 
Austria, Slovak Republic and Japan. These countries are characterised by more pervasive 
Taylorist and Independent forms and under-represented Discretionary learning forms. 
Finally Russia, Korea, Lithuania and Turkey are characterised by the highest share of Simple 
forms, more frequent Independent forms and less learning forms. 
Figure 3 shows the differences in forms of work organisation across industries. Following 
Wren et al. (2013), we can distinguish between the dynamic services (financial, insurance 
and real estate activities; information and communication), the welfare services (education, 
health and social work and public administration) and the non-dynamic services (hotels and 
restaurants; wholesale and retail trade; and other community, social, and personal services). 
Compared with the two other groups, the first group is characterised by high level of ICT 
intensity, productivity growth and international trade. We observe a marked contrast between 
the Discretionary learning form of work organisation and the Taylorist and Simple forms. 
The Discretionary learning form of work organisation is more widespread in dynamic and 
welfare services where the Taylorist and Simple forms of work organisation are less 
prevalent. Simple and Taylorist forms are both more frequent in agriculture, administrative 
and support services, transportation. The Simple form is also emblematic of other 
community, social and personal services while the Taylorist form is more typical in 
accomodation and food service activities and in manufacturing. The Constrained learning 
and Independent forms of work organisation are more evenly widespread across sectors. The 
former just seems to be more typical of human health and social work activities and the latter 
of arts, entertainment and recreation, professional, scientific and technical activities and 
construction. Furthermore, the Discretionary learning form of work organisation is more 
frequent in large-sized firms, whereas the Simple and Independent forms are predominant in 
small-sized establishments. The Simple form can be seen as a traditional forms of work 
organisation in small establishments when the Independent form would be more typical of 
start-ups. 
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Figure 3. Differences in forms of work organisation across industries 
 
Source: First and second rounds PIAAC (2012 and 2015), OECD, weighted statistics.Coverage: These calculations 
include all participating countries and take into consideration those who have worked a paid job as employees during the 
last 12 months preceding the survey, excluding youths aged 16-24 in initial cycle of studies and retired people at State 
pension age. 
 
Figure 4 shows the differences in forms of work organisation across occupations. The 
contrast between the Taylorist and Simple forms and the Discretionary learning forms of 
work organisation also stand out in this figure. The Discretionary learning form is more 
frequent in occupations such as: legislators, senior officials and managers; professionals; 
technicians and associate professionals and armed forces. The Taylorist and Simple forms are 
more widespread in the following occupations: elementary occupations; skilled agricultural 
and fishery workers; plant and machine operators and assemblers; craft and related trades 
workers; service workers and shop and market sales workers. The Constrained learning and 
Independent form of work organisation are less strongly associated with occupations. The 
former is just a little more frequent for clerks and plant and machine operators and 
assemblers, the latter for skilled agricultural and fishery workers, clerks and professionals.  
The aim of the current paper is to analyse the relationship between forms of work 
organisation and vulnerability to non-employment. In this regard, Table 3 gives the 
distribution of the forms of work organisation for both the vulnerable and non-vulnerable 
employees. The form of work organisation characterises the current work for non-vulnerable 
employees and tasks performed in the last work for vulnerable employees. 
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Figure 4. Differences in forms of work organisation across occupations 
Source: First and second rounds PIAAC (2012 and 2015), OECD, weighted statistics. 
Coverage: These calculations include all participating countries and take into consideration those who have worked a 
paid job as employees during the last 12 months preceding the survey, excluding youths aged 16-24 in initial cycle of 
studies and retired people at State pension age. 
 
Table 3. Forms of work organisation by vulnerability status 
 
Source: First and second rounds PIAAC (2012 and 2015), OECD, weighted statistics. 
Coverage: These calculations include all participating countries and take into consideration those who have worked a 
paid job as employees during the last 12 months preceding the survey, excluding youths aged 16-24 in initial cycle of 
studies and retired people at State pension age. 
 
Again, a strong contrast between the Discretionary Learning and the Taylorist forms of work 
organisation appears. The vulnerable employees are relatively more present in the Taylorist 
forms of work organisation (23% versus 15% for non-vulnerable employees), whereas the 
Discretionary Learning form is predominant among the non-vulnerable employees (35% 
versus 21% for vulnerable employees). Vulnerable employees are also slightly more frequent 
in the Independent and Simple forms of work organisation (respectively 27% and 18% 
against 25% and 14% for non-vulnerable employees). 
  
Overall Vulnerable Non-vulnerable
Work organisation (%) (%) (%)
Discretionary learning 33.96 20.99 35.21
Constrained learning 10.47 11.03 10.41
Independent 25.57 27.35 25.40
Simple 14.02 17.80 13.66
Taylorism 15.98 22.83 15.32
Total 100 100 100
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3. MODEL AND VARIABLES 
This section presents the (multilevel) logistic model and both individual- and country-level 
variables. Researchers in social sciences are more and more interested in research questions 
concerning how outcomes at the individual level can be seen as the result of the interplay 
between individual and contextual factors. Indeed, differences in individual outcomes could 
reflect differences in the effects of country-specific characteristics such as labour markets or 
other socioeconomic institutions. As a result, the studies based on multilevel models have 
proliferated during the last two decades and focus on different topics such as educational 
outcomes (O’Connell and McCoach, 2008), in-work poverty (Andress and Lohmann, 2008) 
or quality of working life (Greenan et al., 2014). Regarding the current study, it is our view 
that the incidence for employees of vulnerability on the labour market cannot be thoroughly 
analysed without taking into account not only the individual and employer characteristics but 
also the institutional context. In this section, after describing the empirical model we define 
the variables used in estimations. 
3.1. Model 
We use data from the first and second rounds of PIAAC in the twenty-eight OECD countries 
where all the information needed for our econometric analysis are available. This kind of 
multi-country data set offers the possibility to quantify the extent to which differences in 
individual outcomes (here vulnerability) reflect differences in the effects of country-specific 
characteristics, which are seperate from those associated with variations in the characteristics 
of the individuals themselves (Bryan and Jenkins, 2016). How to “uncover” these country 
effects?  
Let us consider V the dependent variable, vulnerability to non-employment. It is a latent 
continuous variable which is non observable. However, when V become higher than a given 
threshold, we observe that the employee makes a transition to non-employment. 𝑣𝑣 is the 
binary variable that we observe, equal to one if the employee moves out of employment 
during the reference period, to 0 otherwise.  𝑝𝑝, denotes the probability of making a transition 
out of employment (𝑝𝑝 = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑣𝑣 = 1)). 𝑐𝑐𝑘𝑘 represents a 𝑘𝑘 form of work organisation, 𝑘𝑘 
ranging from 1 𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃 5, for our five forms of work organisation defined above. It takes the value 
1 if the employee works or has worked in a 𝑘𝑘 form of work organisation. Finally, we 
consider that 𝑥𝑥 contains all the other socioeconomic and job characteristics that we use as 
controls and 𝑧𝑧 all the country-level variables.  
The standard logistic regression model with country fixed effects is expressed as follows: 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = log �
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
� = 𝛽𝛽1 + �𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
5
𝑘𝑘=2
+ 𝛽𝛽𝟔𝟔𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖                            (1) 
 
where 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the odds ratio of individual 𝑖𝑖 in country 𝑗𝑗, 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 is the country fixed effects which 
represents the effects of unobserved factors that are shared within each country. 𝛽𝛽1 and the 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 
are scalars, while 𝛽𝛽6 is a vector containing the coefficient attached to the control variables in 𝑥𝑥. 
A major drawback of this method is that the country institutional contexts cannot be 
explicitly introduced (Bryan and Jenkins, 2016). Country effects are considered fixed and 
therefore only available for countries in the sample. The results of the estimates cannot be 
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extended to other countries. Moreover, if institutional contexts shape the individual 
behaviours, outcomes are likely to be correlated within countries and the standard error 
estimates are downwardly biased as a result (Hox, 2010; Bryan and Jenkins, 2016). 
Our dataset is hierarchical, with a level 1 (the individual, indexed by 𝑖𝑖) nested in a level 2 
(the country, indexed by 𝑗𝑗). This hierarchical structure as well as possible correlations across 
observations within the countries can be taken into account in a multilevel model which 
enables to obtain statistically efficient estimates of regression coefficients and correct 
standard errors (Hox, 2010). We are going to estimate two models using this more 
appropriate multilevel modelling frame. 
The first model is a multilevel logistic model with country random effects in the constant 
term (random intercept) as well as in four individual-level fixed effects representing the 
different forms of work organisation (random slopes model). We suppose that belonging to 
one of the form of work organisation does not have the same effect according to national 
contexts. The random slope model allows the effect of indicators of form of work 
organisation to vary randomly across countries. In this first model, we assume that country 
effects are distributed randomly (usually normally) across countries. This makes it possible 
to extend our results to other countries. Assuming that the different random terms are not 
correlated, the model can be expressed as follows:  
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = log �
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
� = 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖 + �𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
5
𝑘𝑘=2
+ 𝛽𝛽6𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                      (2) 
where  
𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾1 + 𝑃𝑃1𝑖𝑖 
𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘 + 𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 
 
with  𝑃𝑃1𝑖𝑖 ⟶ 𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎12) and 𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 ⟶ 𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝑘𝑘2) for 𝑘𝑘 = 2, 3, 4, 5 (the first form, Taylorism is 
taken as the reference form of work organisation). The slope of the linear relationship 
between the form of work organisation indicator and the log-odds of being vulnerable is thus 
𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘 + 𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖  for country j. 
A particular advantage of multilevel modelling is the ability to explore the effects of group-
level predictors, i.e. to introduce explicitly the country-level explanatory factors in the model. 
It allows to identify the contextual effects as well as cross-level interactions. Therefore, the 
second multilevel logistic model we estimate goes further as it introduces country-level 
variables and their interactions with the different forms of work organisation so that the four 
individual-level predictors vary with the size of country-level fixed effects (cross-level 
interaction). The interaction effects allow the effect of one explanatory variable on the 
outcome to depend on the value of another explanatory variable. We suppose, for example, 
that the effect of belonging to one of the forms of work organisation on the probability of 
making a transition to non-employment depends on the mix of the country-level labour 
market policies and wage bargaining practices. In order to do so, we extend the model in 
equation 2 to take into consideration country-level variables in 𝑧𝑧. This version of the 
multilevel logistic model considers that the contextual variables in 𝑧𝑧 can explain the national 
differences mentioned earlier. It can be written as follows: 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = log �
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
� = 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖 + �𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
5
𝑘𝑘=2
+ 𝛽𝛽6𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                           (3) 
where  
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𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾1 + 𝛾𝛾11𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 + 𝑃𝑃1𝑖𝑖 
𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘 + 𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘1𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 + 𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖  
 
with r1j ⟶ N(0,σ12) and rkj ⟶ N(0,σk2) for 𝑘𝑘 = 2, 3, 4, 5. γ11 and γk1 are vectors of 
parameters attached to the country-level variables. Country level variables are centred so that 
the intercept gives the odds of the reference individual when the macro variables are at their 
mean value9. 
3.2. Variables 
What are the main driving forces behind the individual and country differences in 
vulnerability to non-employment? We combine micro data on individuals coming from 
PIAAC with macro data describing the institutional context. 
As stressed in the introduction, the relationship between work organisation at the last 
employer and labour market vulnerability of employees has never been investigated with a 
large cross-country dataset. It is a main contribution of this paper to document this issue. 
Apart from work organisation, the background questionnaire of PIAAC provides detailed 
information at the individual level on job and personal characteristics. We are thus able to 
take into account controls that remain most of the time unobserved in studies of labour 
market transition. For instance, we know about the social background of the employee, his 
immigration status and the education level of his parents. For each control, we create a 
missing value category in order to keep the largest sample. The distributions of individual 
and job characteristics variables across vulnerable and non-vulnerable individuals are 
presented in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
At the country level, we consider labour market institution variables, describing labour 
market policies, employment protection legislations and wage bargaining systems as well as 
macroeconomic background variables. 
3.2.1. Job and employer characteristics 
As for the job and employer characteristics, we are able to measure:  
- Institutional sector: private, public and nonprofit. 
- Establishment size: lower or equal to 10, between 11 and 50, between 51 and 250, between 
251 and 1000, more than 1000. 
- Industry classification: 16 categories of industry based on the International Standard 
Industrial Clasification (ISIC) of all economic activities, rev. 4. 
- Occupational classification: 10 categories based on the International Standard Classification 
of Occupations, ISCO-88, 1-digit level. 
- Number of hours worked per week as a continuous variable. 
- Type of employment contract: indefinite versus temporary and other types of employment 
contracts.  
9 One needs to be very cautious when interpreting the results from the model in equation 3. Indeed, there is an issue 
regarding the reliability of estimates from a multilevel logistic regression in relation to the number of subjects at level 2 
(see e.g. Austin, 2010; Moineddin et al., 2011; Stegmueller, 2013; and Bryan and Jenkins, 2016). Bryan and Jenkins 
(2016) conclude that when this number is lower than 30, the estimates of the variance component and their standard 
errors are biased downward, and we need more than 30 when cross-level interactions are included. This issue is further 
discussed in the empirical analysis. 
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- Use of Information and Communication technologies (ICT) in the workplace: use of a 
mainframe, desktop or laptop computer, or any other device that can be used to do such 
things as sending or receiving e-mail messages, processing data or text, or finding things on 
the internet. 
Table A1 shows that private sector employees are more vulnerable than those in public and 
non-profit organisations, that individuals in small-sized firms are more likely to make a 
transition to non-employment (1-50 employees), that there are minor differences in the 
distribution of the two groups across industries. There is a relatively higher vulnerability in 
elementary and semi-skilled occupations in the service sector and agriculture (ISCO 9, 5, 6). 
As expected, there is more vulnerability to non-employment for persons with precarious 
employment contract (temporary contract, temporary employment agency contract, 
apprenticeship or other training scheme, no contract, other employment relation). Finally, 
employees who do not use computers at work are more vulnerable to non-employment. 
3.2.2. Sociodemographic characteristics 
Based on the results of a pre-analysis of the personal determinants of vulnerability to non-
employment, we retain the following variables among those characterising the individuals 
before their entry in the labour market: 
- Age: ten year bands for under 24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, over 55.  
- Education: using the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED), we consider 
three levels: primary or less (ISCED level 1 or less: early childhood and primary education), 
secondary (ISCED level 2 to 4: lower, upper and post-secondary non-tertiary education) and 
university education (ISCED level 5 to 8: doctoral, master, bachelor and short cycle tertiary 
education).  
- Gender: female or male. 
- Marital status: single or living with a spouse or partner.  
- Family responsibilities: no children, 1 child, 2 children and 3 children and more.  
- Social background:  
o Immigration status: first generation immigrants, second generation immigrants, and 
non 1st or 2nd generation immigrant. A first generation immigrant is a person who is 
foreign-born and whose parents (or at least one parent) are foreign-born. A second 
generation immigrant is a native-born person with foreign-born parents. 
o Education level of the parents: uneducated parents, at least one educated parent. 
Table A1 shows that vulnerable individuals are more often single, young females with 
secondary education or less. They more often have either no children or three children or 
more, are first or second generation immigrants and have uneducated parents. 
3.2.3. Institutional and economic factors 
Different institutional factors are likely to influence the individual probability of being 
vulnerable to non-employment. What are the national characteristics potentially important in 
the explanation of the national differences in countries’ vulnerability profile?  
It is usually considered that institutional features, such as unemployment benefits, degree of 
employment protection, as well as active labour market policies are important in order to 
explain labour market transitions (Bassanini and Duval, 2006, 2009). However, theoretical 
considerations about the effects of labour market institutions on labour market transitions 
generally concern the discussion about the impact of labour market institutions on incentives 
to supply labour at any given market wage (European Commission, 2014). So it is most of 
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the time the transition out of unemployment to employment which is implicitly considered10. 
In particular, active labour market policies (active LMP) are generally defined as measures 
which assist the inactive and unemployed to find a job with the objective to bring more 
people into the labour force and into jobs. However, the active LMP also favour the general 
employability of individuals. For instance, workplace training programs are integral part of 
active policies as defined by the OECD. They also contribute to stabilising employment: 
while employment maintenance incentives aim to facilitate continuing employment in 
situations of restructuring, start-up incentives programmes, through the promotion 
entrepreneurship, could foster the creation of more sustainable start-ups. 
We have retained the following variables characterising national labour market policies11: 
- Expenditures on active labour market policies in percentage of the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP): 
o Public employment services and administration 
o Training 
o Employment and start-up incentives 
o Sheltered and supported employment and rehabilitation and direct job creation 
- Expenditures on passive labour market policies in percentage of the GDP. 
In addition to expenditures on labour market policies, we also take into account the degree of 
strictness of employment protection legislation and the centralisation of the wage bargaining 
system. More precisely, we introduce OECD indicators on the strictness of employment 
protection legislation concerning individual and collective dismissals of employees in regular 
employment as well as the use of temporary employment. Two indicators are used. They 
measure respectively the procedures and costs involved in dismissing individuals or groups 
of workers and the procedures involved in hiring workers on fixed-term or temporary work 
agency contracts. For each year, indicators refer to the regulation in force on the 1st of 
January. The data range from 0 to 6 with higher scores representing stricter regulation. It is 
usually considered that higher costs and more complex procedures in dismissing individuals 
favour job stability (OECD, 2004; Bassanini and Garnero, 2013). 
The centralisation of wage bargaining is reflected by a summary measure taking into account 
both union density and bargaining coverage at multiple levels. According to Calmfors and 
Driffill (1988) countries with highly centralised and highly decentralised wage bargaining 
systems have lower unemployment than countries with an intermediate degree of 
centralisation. Recent empirical evidence has shown that this relationship has become weaker 
together with the loss of union influence and stresses the need to take into account the diversity 
10 For some kinds of labour market policies such as unemployment insurance benefits the transitions out of non-
participation are also considered. For example, with higher unemployment benefits the “non actives” would increase their 
labour market participation in order to become eligible for unemployment benefits. 
11 The total expenditures on labour market policies is partitioned into expenditures in two types of labour market 
policies: active and passive. There are 6  active policies: public employment services and administration; training; 
employment incentives; sheltered and supported employment and rehabilitation; direct job creation; start-up incentives. 
The passive policies are of two types: out-of-income maintenance and support and early retirement. The reader can refer 
to the OECD database for more details about these elements of the expenditures on labour market policies. We have 
grouped employment incentives policies and start up incentive policies together as well as direct job creation and 
sheltered and supported employment and rehabilitation. We obtain 5 variables describing LMPs as a percentage of GDP. 
This choice has been made to reduce the number of country-level variables in the multilevel model in order to have more 
reliable estimates. However, a thorough analysis of the data has been performed (using correlation analysis and principal 
component analysis) regarding all country-level variables to select the ones presented here. These variables turn out to 
summarize the essential aspects of the different institutions and economies across OECD countries relevant to the current 
analysis, avoiding information redundancies.  
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of labour market institutions (Aidt and Tzannatos, 2002). However, in the current study, we 
consider a quadratic relationship between individual vulnerability and centralisation of wage 
bargaining system (WBS) to account for the possibility of it being hump-shaped. 
Finally, the sectoral structure, the country innovation performance as well as the 
macroeconomic conditions are reflected in the share of employment in services, R&D 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP and GDP growth rate. 
The variables retained come from either the OECD database or the database on institutional 
characteristics of trade unions, wage settings, state interventions and social pacts 1960-2014 
(ICTWSS) from Jelle Visser of Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies. They are 
displayed in Table A2 in the Appendix. 
4. RESULTS 
4.1. Fixed and random effects 
All models estimate a weighted multilevel logistic regression of the probability of being 
vulnerable to non-employment, using the survey sample weights. We estimate four 
multilevel models. Model 1 (see Equation 2) is a random slope logit regression in which we 
allow the constant term of the model and the effects of working in other forms of work 
organisation than Taylorism, which is the reference form of work organisation in the 
regressions, to vary randomly across countries. It is estimated for the largest group of twenty-
eight countries. All remaining three models are based on the specification given in 
Equation 3. They include country level variables on the share of services in employment, 
GDP growth rate and R&D investments. In addition to these three variables, Model 2 
includes labour market policies variables, Model 3 employment protection legislation 
variables and Model 4 wage bargaining variables. As the labour market institution variables 
are not available in the same group of countries (see Table A2 in the Appendix) estimations 
in Models 2 to 4 cover different sets of countries. All three models also consider, in addition 
to country-level variables, their interactions with the different forms of work organisation. 
This allows us to account for observed differences between countries in the response variable 
and in the effects of work organisation. 
The results are given in Tables 4, 5 and Table A3 in the Appendix. Table 4 shows the results 
of the estimation of the four different models for our variables of interest, the indicators of 
forms of work organisation, and the random parts of the multilevel models. Table 5 reports 
the estimates for country-level variables and cross-level interactions. Finally, Table A3 in the 
Appendix shows the estimation of individual fixed effects. 
The estimates of the variance of the random terms, given in the lower part of Table 4, show 
considerable variation of the estimates of the constant term and the coefficient attached to the 
different forms of work organisation across countries. The intercept variance of 0.141 in 
Model 1 is interpreted as the between-country variance in the log-odds of being vulnerable 
for a reference individual living in an average OECD country, while the slope variation of 
Discretionary Learning of 0.096, for example, is the between-country variance in the effect 
of Discretionary Learning on the probability of being vulnerable. We note that the slope 
coefficients with the largest variance are associated with the learning forms of work 
organisation. Across countries, the relationships between the Contrained learning and the 
Discretionary learning forms of work organisation and vulnerability to non-employment 
differs significantly. 
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Table 4. Fixed and random effects estimates 
 
Notes: Significant at **** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. Standard errors are into parenthesis for the estimates of the random terms 
variances. All models control for personal and job. Table A3 in the Appendix shows estimates of coefficients attached to 
the control variables. Model 1 does not include any country-level variables. Model 2 to 4 include economic factors and 
their interactions to the different types of work organisation. In addition to these variables, Model 2 considers labour 
market policy variables, while Model 3 includes employment protection legislation variables and Model 4 takes into 
account the wage bargaining system. We also use sample weight in these estimations. 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, the multilevel model allows not only to identify the 
country-effect, but also to account for it through the country level variables. It is indeed 
important not only to know whether there are differences between countries, but also to know 
the factors behind these differences. In order to answer such questions, we extend Model 1 to 
include country-level variables that can explain these differences as well as their interaction 
with the different forms of work organisation: this leads to Models 2 to 4. By introducing the 
cross-level interaction terms between the forms of work organisation indicators and 
macroeconomic variables, we analyse if institutional contexts reinforce or, on the contrary, 
lessen the impact of the forms of work organisation on individuals’ vulnerability to non-
employment. 
We note that the unobserved variations of the random terms in Models 2 to 4 reduces 
considerably compared to Model 1 (cf. Table 4). Therefore, we may say that our country-
level variables explain an important part of the inobserved heterogeneity between countries 
in the probability  of being vulnerable and the effect of forms of work organisation. 
4.2. The impact of forms of work organisation 
The top panel of Table 4 gives the coefficients associated with the intercept and the four forms 
of work organisation, Taylorism being the reference category. The intercept in Model 1 gives 
the probability of being vulnerable to non-employment for the reference individual, a young 
male worker (under 24 years old) with primary education or less, no children, native since two 
generations, with educated parents, working in the private sector with an indefinite contract, 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Fixed Effects estimates
Intercept -1.574*** -1.938*** -1.867*** -1.897***
Work organisation (ref. Taylorism)
Discretionary learning -0.571*** -0.559*** -0.543*** -0.636***
Independent -0.141** -0.125** -0.114* -0.172***
Simple -0.220*** -0.186** -0.202*** -0.256**
Constrained learning -0.200** -0.217*** -0.200** -0.391***
Random effects estimates
Intercept 0.141  (0.037) 0.048   (0.014) 0.091   (0.026) 0.087   (0.025)
Discretionary learning 0.096  (0.026) 0.035   (0.010) 0.093   (0.027) 0.064   (0.018)
Independent 0.061   (0.016) 0.023   (0.007) 0.041   (0.012) 0.035  (0.010)
Simple 0.084   (0.023) 0.043   (0.013) 0.051    (0.015) 0.060   (0.017)
Constrained learning 0.147   (0.039) 0.088   (0.026) 0.109   (0.031) 0.055  (0.016)
Number of individuals 89705 78439 78985 80317
Number of countries 28 23 24 24
-2 Log Pseudo-Likelihood 3.0089E8 2.3121E8 2.4958E8 2.2601E8
Multilevel logistic regression
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performing an elementary occupation in a Taylorist form of work organisation implying no use 
of ICT in a manufacturing establishment with less than 10 employees, working an average 
number of hours per week. His chances of making a transition to non-employment is 17%12, 
about twice the average vulnerability in the overall population (cf. Table 1 in section 1). But if 
this reference employee had experienced a Discretionary learning form of work organisation, 
his odds of being non-employed would be much lower, amounting to 10%13 which is close to 
average vulnerability. In an Independent form, it would be 15%, and 14% in a Constrained 
learning or Simple form. In Models 2 to 4, the reference situation changes slightly as our 
reference employee is now part of an average country in the sense that the country level 
variables entered in each model are at their mean value. The results associated with the 
different forms of work organisation remain close to those found in Model 1, except for the 
coefficient associated with the Constrained learning form of work organisation which becomes 
higher in absolute value than that of the Simple form (except Model 3), implying that the odds 
of being non-employed are lower for employees in Constrained learning form of work 
organisation. The hierarchy in the impact of forms of work organisation remains unchanged in 
these models: The Discretionary learning form is the form of work organisation where 
vulnerability to non-employment is the lowest, followed by the Constrained learning form, the 
Simple form and the Independent form. More precisely a person working in a Discretionary 
Learning organisation reduces nearly by a half his/her chance of being vulnerable to non-
employment, compared to another person working in a Taylorist organisation. The same can be 
said regarding persons working in Constrained learning or Simple or Independent forms of 
work organisation, but to a lesser extent14. 
Our findings show that some forms of work organisation are more efficient than others for 
maintaining employability and securing employment. We have to keep in mind that although 
the regressions are cross-sectional they implicitly compare two points in time (now and 
sometime in the last twelve months) and they are obtained using a very large set of controls 
taking into account sociodemographic characteristics including social background, 
employment relations characteristics and detailed occupations and industry (cf. Table A3 in 
the Appendix). We thus hope to be the closest possible to a pure work organisation effect15. 
We find that the Discretionary Learning and the Constrained Learning forms of work 
organisation that favour skills development through on-the-job training, knowledge sharing, 
problem solving and job discretion are more efficient at securing employment than forms of 
work organisation where employees perform simple tasks and lack discretion that would 
allow them to take advantage of learning opportunities like in Taylorist organisations or lack 
access to organised on-the-job training like in the Independent organisations or, finally, lack 
opportunities to share knowledge with their co-workers like in Simple organisations. 
As for individual fixed effects, the great majority of significant results (cf. Table A3 in the 
Appendix) are in line with those found in the literature on labour market insecurity measured 
by the transition rate between employment and unemployment (for example, Duhautois et al., 
2014). Women are significantly more vulnerable to non-employment than men. Vulnerability 
12 This predicted probability is calculated using the following formula : 1/(1+exp(1.574)) 
13 1/(1+exp(1.574+0.571)) 
14 In order to obtain the percentage of variation in the odds of being vulnerable for one unit change in explanatory 
variable we use the following formula: 100 × {𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝(𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘) − 1}  
15 We cannot rule out however that individuals self select or are selected into different forms of work organisation 
according to unobserved characteristics that also contribute to explaining their vulnerability to non-employment. 
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to non-employment is significantly higher for very young workers (aged under 24 years old) 
while individuals aged between 35 and 54 have the lowest probability to make a transition. 
More educated workers are more protected against vulnerability to non-employment. Indeed, 
higher education generally implies higher job stability (Charlot and Malherbet, 2013). 
Precarious employment contracts (temporary versus indefinite) are associated with a higher 
probability of making a transition out of employment. An important number of temporary 
jobs in an economy leads to both a higher level of job creation and of job destruction. Job 
destruction of temporary employment is particularly important during economic recessions. 
The end of a temporary contract which is not renewed is an important factor of vulnerability 
to non-employment. Controlling for education, the use of ICT at work is associated for 
employees with lower levels of labour market vulnerability. Vulnerability is also lower in 
bigger establishments. Finally, compared to elementary occupations, white-collar 
occupations like legislators, professionals and technicians, but also blue collar occupations 
like plant and machine operators experience lower levels of vulnerability. 
4.3. Country level heterogeneity 
Table 5 reports the estimated effects in Models 2 to 4 of the country-level and cross-level 
interactions16 on the probability of being vulnerable to non-employment. By construction, the 
direct effects of the macroeconomic indicators (column 1 of each model) reflect the impact of 
institutional contexts on the reference individual who is working in the Taylorist form of 
work organisation. In growing countries and in countries with high R&D investments, 
employees working in Taylorist forms of work organisation tend to be less vulnerable to non-
employment. However, these negative coefficients are significant in Model 3 only for GDP 
growth, in Models 2 and 4 for R&D investments. Model 2 includes expenditures in labour 
market policy along with economic factors. According to their target, active labour market 
policies have contrasted impacts on the vulnerabilty of employees in Taylorist forms of work 
organisation. When they target public employment services and administration, sheltered and 
supported employment and rehabilitation or direct job creation, they have a protective effect, 
but when they target training, employment incentives or start-up incentives, employees in 
Taylorist forms of work organisation are more vulnerable to non-employment. Model 3 
considers the strictness of employment protection legislation. The results associated with 
Taylorist forms of work organisation show that strict employment protection legislation 
regarding dismissals is associated with lower vulnerability when strict employment 
protection legislation regarding the use of temporary contracts is associated with higher 
vulnerability. Moreover, it is in this model that the coefficient on GDP growth rate comes out 
significantly negative. Thus, the story here could be the following. The economic recession 
led to job destructions especially for the simple jobs found in Taylorist organisations. As they 
have not invested in skills building or organisational learning, their labour force is mainly 
substitutable. Facing adverse shocks, they reduce their hiring activities and increase 
dismissals, generating flows from employment to unemployment or to inactivity. On the 
16 A critical aspect of these models is the number of subjects at level 2. Studies investigating the reliability of multilevel 
model estimates in relation to the number of subjects in level 2 suggest using at least 30 subjects when level 2 variables 
and cross-level interactions are introduced. In the current study, we have 12 country-level variables with varying 
availability across countries, except for economic factors. In order to run estimations on the largest possible contry set, 
we prefer to introduce one group of country-level variable at a time, using economic factors as control. This leads to 
using 23 or 24 countries in estimations, thus facing possible asymptotic issues. However, we tested the stability of the 
results when country level variables were introduced one at a time. 
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contrary, as soon as the recovery is back, they hire new workers on temporary short-term 
contracts. Finally in Model 4, the degree of centralisation of the wage bargaining system is 
taken into account. We find that the highest the degree of centralisation, the lowest the 
vulnerability to non-employment of employees in Taylorist forms of work organisation. 
The interpretation of the estimated parameters of the cross-level interactions (columns 2 to 5 of 
each model) is different from that of the direct effect on column 1. Here, the country-level 
variables are moderating the effects of the variables they are interacted with. Starting with the 
Discretionary learning form of work organisation, given the negative direct effect of this form 
of work organisation (Table 4) on vulnerability, a positive estimate on the interaction term 
means that the country-level variable in question reduces the protective effect of Discretionary 
learning compared with Taylorism while a negative sign of the interaction term would mean 
that the given policy amplifies its beneficial effect. As an illustration, we can calculate the 
effect of Discretionary learning on the log-odds of being vulnerable for different values of 
macroeconomic variables. For example, in France only 0.07% of the GDP go to employment 
and start-up incentives while this indicator is 0.65% in Sweden (Table A2). For France the 
effect of Discretionary learning compared with Taylorism is: -0.559-(1.737*(0.07-0.126))=-
0.46; while in Sweden it is: -0.559-(1.737*(0.65-0.126))=-1.4717. 
Economic factors have the same influence on employees in the Discretionary learning model 
as on those in the Taylorist model (cross-level interactions are not significant or they have 
the same sign), except in Model 2 where the share of services in employment is associated 
with a significant positive coefficient. Hence, employees in Discretionary learning 
organisations are less protected against transitions out of employment in countries with a 
larger services sector. Furthermore, we find that expenditures in sheltered and supported 
employment and rehabilitation and in direct job creation reduce the protective effect of the 
Discretionary learning form of work organisation compared with Taylorism, while 
employment incentives and start-up incentives have the opposite moderating effect. Hence 
employment is not secured by the same active labour market policies in Taylorist and 
Discretionary learning forms of work organisation. We do not find any further results for the 
Discretionary learning in Model 3 when we take into account the strictness of employment 
protection legislation, but we identify in Model 4 a specific impact of the centralisation of the 
wage bargaining system. This effect is non-monotonous (the direct effect is negative and the 
squared term is positive and significant), showing that compared with Taylorism, the 
Discretionary Learning form is more efficient in protecting from vulnerability to non-
employment when there is an intermediate level of centralisation of wage bargaining. 
Compared with Taylorism, employees in the Independent forms of work organisation are 
more vulnerable to non-employment when R&D investments are high, but in Model 4, 
employees in these forms of work organisation are also less vulnerable in countries where the 
services sector represents a higher share of employment. Apart from these effects, the 
Independent form of work organisation appears quite close to the Discretionary learning 
form. The main difference between the two forms is the significant protective impact of 
training expenditures that complement that of employment and start up incentives. As active 
LMP, training expenditures could be particularly efficient in Independent forms of work 
organisation because these organisations offer very little on-the-job training to their 
employees (see Table 2).  
17 Taking the exponential of -0.46 and -1.47, we obtain that the odds of being vulnerable is 0.63 in France and 0.23 in 
Sweden while it is 0.71 in a country with zero expenditures on employment and start-up incentives (Chile, for example). 
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Table 5. Estimates for the coefficients attached to the country- and cross-levels interactions variables in Models 2, 3 and 4 
 
Note: Significant level at * 10%, **5%, ***1%. This table is not presenting the regression of the different forms of work organisation. It shows the estimates from the part of our 
random effect model with country level variables and their interactions with the different forms of work organisation. This way of presenting these results improve the readability. It 
clearly shows how differencies between countries affect the relationship between work organisation and vulnerability to non-employment.  The first column of each block shows the 
direct effects of the country-level variables (estimates of the coefficients attached to them). It can also be considered the effect of the interaction with the form of work organisation of 
the reference individual (Taylorism). The other columns represent the estimates of the coefficients attached to the interaction between the country-level variables and the different 
forms of work organisation. 
Intercept Intercept Intercept
Taylorism 
(reference)
Discretionary 
learning
Independent Simple Constrained 
learning
Taylorism 
(reference)
Discretionary 
learning
Independent Simple Constrained 
learning
Taylorism 
(reference)
Discretionary 
learning
Independent Simple Constrained 
learning
Economic factors
Share of services in employment -0.648 2.007*** 0.010 1.275 -0.079 -0.317 0.342 -0.955 1.213 -0.705 1.267 0.575 -1.125** -0.979 -3.160***
GDP growth rate -0.009 -0.078** -0.041 -0.025 -0.169*** -0.110*** 0.013 0.029 0.085*** -0.011 -0.051 -0.027 0.001 0.022 -0.123***
Research & Development (% GDP) -0.180*** 0.036 0.134*** -0.035 -0.018 -0.056 -0.012 0.099* -0.038 -0.078 -0.127* 0.002 0.124*** 0.088 0.035
Labour Market Institutions
Expenditures on labour market policies (% GDP)
Public employment services and administration -0.818* -0.271 -0.065 -0.302 -0.410 . . . . . . . . . .
Training 1.421*** -0.392 -0.453* -0.075 -0.393 . . . . . . . . . .
Employment and start-up incentives 1.756*** -1.737*** -1.029*** -0.175 -0.387 . . . . . . . . . .
Sheltered and supported employment and rehabilitation 
and direct job creation -0.540* 0.616** 0.411* 0.401 0.510 . . . . . . . . . .
Passive labour market policies 0.015 -0.132 -0.100 -0.253** -0.369*** . . . . . . . . . .
Strictness of employment protection legislation
Individual and collective dismissals . . . . . -0.270* 0.010 0.051 0.321*** 0.342** . . . . .
Use of temporary contract . . . . . 0.118* 0.038 0.009 -0.036 -0.114 . . . . .
Trade union and wage setting
Measure of the Centralisation of wage bargaining . . . . . . . . . . -0.234 -0.646 -0.244 0.197 -0.639**
Measure of the Centralisation of wage bargaining squared . . . . . . . . . . -4.120*** 4.856*** 3.254*** 1.363 6.467***
Number of individuals
Number of countries
-2 Log Pseudo-Likelihood 2.3121E8 2.4958E8 2.2601E8
78439 78985 80317
23 24 24
Country-level variable * Work organisation
Model 2: Labour market policies Model 3: Employment protection legislation Model 4: Centralisation of wage bargaining system
Forms of work organisation Forms of work organisation Forms of work organisation
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No economic factors or labour market policy significantly amplify the negative direct effect 
of the Simple form of work organisation on the probability of being vulnerable, except 
expenditures on passive labour market policies. Dedicated mainly to out of income 
maintenance and support these expenditures increase the protective effect of Simple forms of 
work organisation compared with Taylorist ones. Two further country level effects are 
identified in Model 3, but they reduce the protective effect of Simple forms compared with 
Taylorist forms: GDP growth rate and strictness of employment protection legislation on 
dismissals. 
Finally, vulnerability to non-employment in the Constrained learning forms of work 
organisation compared with Taylorist ones is further reduced by GDP growth (Models 2 and 
4) and by the development of the services sector. If we consider labour market policies 
(Model 2) and employment protection legislation (Model 3), country level impacts for the 
Constrained learning form and for the Simple form are close to one another: passive LMPs 
are associated with lower vulnerability and strictness of employment legislation on 
dismissals have the opposite effect. However, Model 4 shows a specific and strong effect 
with the Constrained learning form, which is also found albeit weaker with the Discretionary 
learning and the Independent forms of work organisation: the impact of the degree of 
centralisation of the wage bargaining system is clearly hump-shaped, implying that 
intermediate levels of bargaining are the most efficient to protect employees from transitions 
out of employment.  
CONCLUSIONS 
Work organisation is often considered as a central element in fostering economic and 
business development. In recent years, restructuring of organisations have been widely 
observed in many OECD countries. At the same time nonstandard work, as well as 
unemployment, has been on the rise. We argue that the capacity of workers to secure their 
employment in a changing work environment is related to the form of work organisation in 
which they are employed.  
Most studies on labour market vulnerability rely on the study of supply side factors while 
the literature dealing with the concept of work organisation usually analyses it in terms of 
its relationship with productivity, innovation and working conditions rather than with 
labour market outcomes. This paper examines the relationship between the different forms 
of work organisation in workplaces and the vulnerability to non-employment within 
countries taking part in rounds 1 and 2 of the Programme for the Assessment of Adults 
Competencies (PIAAC) – a cross-country survey carried out by the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Using hierarchical cluster analysis, we 
define five forms of work organisation based on the description given by employees of the 
tasks they perform: Discretionary Learning, Constrained Learning, Independent, Simple 
and Taylorist. Workers in Discretionary learning forms of work organisation have a higher 
degree of autonomy in the way they do their job, they plan their own activities and organise 
their own time on a daily basis. They are also more frequently involved in learning 
activities and in solving complex problems at work. The Constrained Learning form of 
work organisation differs from the Discretionary Learning in terms of discretion, problem 
solving and influence at work, but employees have more learning opportunities than in the 
other three forms of work organisation through collaborations and sharing of information as 
well as through on the job training. The Independent form of work organisation is above 
31 
Document de travail du Centre d’études de l’emploi et du travail, n° 195, décembre 2017 
the overall mean regarding discretion at work and in sharing work-related information. The 
Simple form of work organisation is opposite to the Discretionary learning form as 
employees perform less frequently than in the overall population all the listed tasks. Thus, 
they perform more simple jobs in simpler organisations. However, in this form of work 
organisation, compared with the Independent form, employees receive more on-the-job 
training. Finally, the Taylorist form of work organisation is characterised by below average 
frequency for all listed tasks except for two of them: cooperating or collaborating and 
sharing work-related information. The employees perform simple tasks in more structured 
organisations than in the Simple forms.  
Then multilevel logistic regression is used to evaluate the impact of forms of work 
organisation on vulnerability to non-employment. The latter is defined as the probability to 
make a transition from employment to non-employment over a one year time period. An 
advantage of multilevel modelling is that it allows to analyse variables from different levels 
simultaneously, using a statistical model that properly organises these various dependencies. 
National factors, including economic factors or labour market institutions could influence the 
probability of being vulnerable to non-employment. Our results thus identify both the most 
protective forms of work organisation and the national policies which moderate their effects. 
The results show indeed a significant impact of work organisation on vulnerability to non-
employment after controlling for relevant job and personal characteristics. However, its 
size depends on the type of work organisation. Compared to Taylorism all other forms of 
work organisation decrease the employees’ probability of making a transition out of 
employment. In particular, employees in Learning forms of work organisation, where they 
have a certain degree of discretion in the planning of their activities and time, are the least 
vulnerable. 
The results also show that employment policies need to take into account the structure of the 
economy in terms of forms of work organisation. Active labour market policies such as 
training and employment and start-up incentives are efficient at protecting employment in 
countries where the Discretionary Learning and the Independent forms of work organisation 
are widespread. This is because they tend to lower the probability of making a transition out 
of employment for employees in these two forms of work organisation. These active LMPs 
are much less efficient in countries where Taylorist, Simple or Constrained learning forms of 
work organisation are predominant. In such countries, expenditures in public employment 
services and adminitration, sheltered and supported employment and rehabilitation and direct 
job creation provide better shields against workers’ flows out of employment. In addition for 
employees in Simple and Constrained learning forms, passive LMPs have a protective role. 
Employment protection legislation also moderate the impact of forms of work organisation 
on vulnerability to non-employment. Stricter legislation on dimissal reduce the probability of 
making a transition out of employment in Taylorist forms of work organisation while the 
opposit result is observed for stricter legislation on use of temporary contract. From this point 
of view, the Discretionary learning and Independent forms of work organisation behave like 
the Taylorist form. However, in the Simple and Constrained learning forms, we do not 
observe any protective effect of stricter employment protection legislation on dismissals. 
Furthermore, an intermediate level of centralisation of wage bargaining favours the capacity 
of the Constrained learning form of work organisation to secure employment. The same 
conclusion holds in countries with large shares of Discretionary learning and Independent 
forms of work organisation, unlike in countries with a predominant Taylorist work 
organisation where a high level of centralisation of the wage bargaining system secures for 
employees lower levels of labour market vulnerability. 
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Finally, our results should stimulate reflections and further research on national policies that 
encourage firms’ organisational choices in order to adapt the forms of work organisation 
(especially Discretionary Learning) which protect individuals from vulnerability to non-
employment. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1. Job and sociodemographic characteristics by vulnerability status 
 
Overall Vulnerable Non-vulnerable 
Variables (%) (%) (%)
Characteristics of the employer
Economic sector 
Private 72.4 75.5 72.1
Public 24.9 21.9 25.2
Nonprofit 2.5 2.1 2.49
Missing values 0.2 0.5 0.2
Establishment size 
<10 employees 26.1 35.2 25.2
11-50 employees 30.2 32.5 30
51-250 employees 23.1 18.6 23.6
251-1000 employees 11.4 6.8 11.9
>1000 employees 8 4.7 8.4
Missing values (mostly self-employed without employees) 1.2 2.2 0.9
Industry classification ISIC Rev 4 
A: Agriculture, forestry and fishing 1.8 3.6 1.7
BC: Manufacturing, mining and quarrying) 19 14.3 19.5
DE: Electricity, gas and Water supply; sewerage and waste management 1.9 2.9 1.8
F: construction 7 8.6 6.8
G: Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 13.3 13.8 13.2
H: Transportation and storage 6.1 5 6.2
I: Accommodation and food service activities 4.5 8.2 4.2
J: Information and communication 3.1 1.9 3.2
KL: Financial and insurance activities; Real estate activities 3.5 2.9 3.6
M: Professional, scientific and technical activities 3.9 4.3 3.8
N: Administrative and support service activities 4.7 6.3 4.5
O: Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 7.2 4.9 7.4
P: Education 8.5 7.3 8.6
Q: Human health and social work activities 10.6 8.3 10.8
R: Arts, entertainment and recreation 1.5 2.4 1.4
STU: Other service activities 2.6 2.3 2.7
Missing values 0.8 3 0.6
Characteristics of the job
Occupational classification ISCO 1 digit 
0: Armed forces 0.6 0.4 0.6
1: Legislators, senior officials and managers 6.3 3.7 6.6
2: professionals 16.9 13.2 17.3
3: Technicians and associate professionals 14.3 8.8 14.9
4: Clerks 11.2 11 11.2
5: Service workers and shop and market sales workers 18.7 23.5 18.3
6: Skilled agricultural and fishery workers 1 1.8 0.9
7: Craft and related trades workers 11.9 12.7 11.8
8: Plant and machine operators and assemblers 9.5 8.3 9.6
9:Elementary occupations 8.9 15.7 8.2
Missing values 0.7 0.9 0.6
Type of employment contract 
Indefinite 70.8 42.9 73.6
Temporary 16.8 33.3 15.1
Others: temporary employment agency contract; apprenticeship or othe      12.2 23.4 11.1
Missing values (for Austria, United States and Canada) 0.2 0.4 0.2
Average number of hours worked per week (mean) 39.6 37.9 39.8
Experience with computer at work 
Use ICT at work 62.1 44.3 63.9
Do not use ICT at work 37.8 55.6 36.1
Missing values 0.1 0.1 0
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Table A1 (continued). Job and sociodemographic characteristics by vulnerability status 
 
Source: First and second rounds PIAAC (2012 and 2015), OECD. 
Coverage: These calculations include all participating countries and take into consideration those who have worked a 
paid job as employees during the last 12 months preceding the survey, excluding youths aged 16-24 in initial cycle of 
studies and retired people at State pension age. 
Note: These percentages have been computed using sample weights and their standard errors are estimated using 
jackknife method. Bold figures for one group means they have a significantly higher percentage. 
Overall Vulnerable Non-vulnerable 
Variables (%) (%) (%)
Sociodemographic characteristics
Age in 10 year bands
<24 7 13.3 6.3
25-34 26.6 30.7 26.2
35-44 27.3 23.3 27.7
45-54 24.7 18.8 25.3
55 plus 14.4 13.9 14.5
Education level
Primary 4.5 8.8 4.1
Secondary 53.5 56.1 53.2
University 41.8 35.1 42.6
Missing values 0.2 0 0.1
Gender 
female 46 54.9 45.1
Male 54 45.1 54.9
Marital status 
Single 22.8 31.6 22
Living with spouse or partner 66.9 58 67.8
Missing values 10.3 10.4 10.2
Family responsibilities: Number of children 
No children 32.8 39.4 32.1
One child 21.3 22.6 21.2
Two children 32 24.6 32.8
Three children or more 13.9 13.4 13.9
Social background 
Immigration 
First generation immigrant 6.8 9.1 6.6
Second generation immigrant 2.2 2.4 2.2
Non 1st or 2nd generation immigrant 85.4 83.9 85.6
Missing values 5.6 4.6 5.6
Parents' level of education 
Uneducated parents 35.4 39.2 35
At least one educated parents 58.1 53.7 58.6
Missing values 6.5 7.1 6.4
Number of observations 89705 7192 82513
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Table A2. Country-level variables 
 
Source: OECD database for labour market policy and employment protection legislation variables; for the centralization measure, the database on institutional characteristics of 
trade unions, wage setting, state intervention and social pacts (ICTWSS) by Jelle Vesser; and World Bank database for all the economic factors variables. The strictness of 
employment protection is baseed from an OECD index and range from 1 to 6 for each country. The measure of the centralisation of the wage bargaining takes into account of both 
union authority and union concentration at multiple level and range from 0 to 1. All these variables are measured in 2012, except for countries from the round 2 of PIAAC for 
which the variables are measured in 2015. 
Public 
employment 
services and 
administration Training
Employment and 
start-up incentives
Sheltered and 
supported 
employment 
and 
rehabilitation 
and direct job 
creation Dismissal
Use of temporary 
contract
Belgium 0.20 0.16 0.22 0.21 2.02 1.89 2.38 0.48 78 0.2 2.36
Chile 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.23 2.63 3.00 . 67 2.3 0.39
Cyprus . . . . . . . 0.29 80 1.7 0.46
Czech Republic 0.11 0.01 0.02 0.11 0.23 2.92 1.44 0.25 59 -0.8 1.78
Denmark 0.32 0.53 0.38 0.59 1.65 2.20 1.38 0.42 78 0.2 2.98
Estonia 0.10 0.14 0.03 0.00 0.42 1.81 1.88 0.32 64 4.3 2.12
Finland 0.15 0.50 0.16 0.19 1.40 2.17 1.56 0.43 73 -1.4 3.42
France 0.26 0.35 0.07 0.22 1.42 2.38 3.63 0.24 75 0.2 2.23
Germany 0.33 0.22 0.06 0.06 0.95 2.68 1.00 0.47 70 0.5 2.87
Greece . . . . . 2.17 2.25 0.27 72 -0.2 0.97
Ireland 0.17 0.39 0.07 0.25 2.38 1.40 0.63 0.46 77 -1.1 1.56
Israel 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.56 2.04 0.88 . 80 2.5 4.25
Italy 0.12 0.14 0.19 0.00 1.56 2.76 2.00 0.38 69 -2.8 1.27
Japan 0.07 0.01 0.09 0.03 0.25 1.37 0.88 0.32 69 1.5 3.34
Korea 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.23 0.28 2.37 2.13 0.32 69 2.3 4.03
Lithuania 0.06 0.02 0.08 0.09 0.23 . . 0.36 66 1.8 1.04
Netherlands 0.28 0.10 0.03 0.47 1.62 2.82 0.94 0.57 72 -1.1 1.94
New Zealand 0.09 0.12 0.01 0.05 0.39 1.39 1.00 0.31 71 3.4 1.16
Norway 0.12 0.15 0.09 0.16 0.34 2.33 3.00 0.51 77 2.7 1.62
Poland 0.08 0.01 0.14 0.20 0.32 2.23 1.75 0.18 57 1.6 0.88
Russia . . . . . . . . 65 3.5 1.05
Singapore . . . . . . . 0.85 83 2.0 2.20
Slovakia 0.07 0.00 0.13 0.06 0.43 1.71 1.63 0.50 59 1.7 0.81
Slovenia 0.09 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.82 2.60 1.81 0.32 60 2.3 2.21
Spain 0.08 0.15 0.28 0.13 3.03 2.21 2.69 0.38 75 -2.9 1.29
Sweden 0.27 0.10 0.65 0.25 0.63 2.61 0.81 0.52 78 -0.3 3.28
Turkey . . . . . 2.31 4.88 . 52 4.0 1.01
United Kingdom 0.20 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.31 1.26 0.38 0.11 79 1.3 1.61
Countries/  
Variables
Labour Market Institutions Economic factors
Expenditures on Labour Market policies (LMP) in % of GDP Strictness of employment 
protection legislation
Centralisation 
of wage 
bargaining
% of services 
in 
employment 
GDP 
growth in 
%
Expenditures 
in R&D in % 
of GDP
Active
Passive
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Table A3. Multilevel logistic regression estimates for coefficients attached to control variables 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Fixed effects estimates
Characteristics of the employer
Economic sector (ref. private sector)
public 0.089 -0.139 -0.103 -0.137
Nonprofit 0.141 0.158 0.139 0.183
Missing values 0.442 0.395 0.418 0.443
Establishment size (ref. <10 employees)
11-50 employees -0.070 -0.124** -0.107* -0.126**
51-250 employees -0.289*** -0.221** -0.202** -0.232**
251-1000 employees -0.434*** -0.359*** -0.314*** -0.349***
>1000 employees -0.381*** -0.340*** -0.364*** -0.351***
Missing values 0.295 -0.056 -0.122 -0.045
Industry classification ISIC Rev 4 (ref. isic1_BC:  Manufacturing, mining and quarrying)
A: Agriculture, forestry and fishing 0.227 0.403*** 0.387*** 0.351**
DE: Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply, and        0.909*** 0.581*** 0.507*** 0.578***
F: Construction 0.325*** 0.260** 0.291** 0.255*
G: Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and 0.031 0.207 0.185 0.201
H: Transportation and storage -0.031 0.169 0.078 0.135
I: Accommodation and food service activities 0.274** 0.422*** 0.333** 0.418***
J: Information and communication -0.018 0.291 0.275 0.289
KL: Financial and insurance activities; Real estate activities 0.340 0.710*** 0.625*** 0.693***
M: Professional, scientific and technical activities 0.451*** 0.352*** 0.353*** 0.368***
N: Administrative and support service activities 0.131 0.350** 0.211 0.335**
O: Public administration and defence; compulsory social se -0.170 0.220 0.093 0.217
P: Education -0.141 0.230* 0.129 0.236*
Q: Human health and social work activities -0.131 0.001 -0.051 -0.001
R: Arts, entertainment and recreation 0.410** 0.541*** 0.549*** 0.569***
STU: Other service activities; Activities of households as em                 -0.566*** -0.404*** -0.394*** -0.352**
Missing values 1.786** 0.309 1.980*** 0.264
Characteristics of the job
Occupational classification ISCO 1 digit (ref. ISCO 9 elementary occupations)
0: Armed forces -0.050 -0.472 -0.556 -0.751
1: Legislators, senior officials and managers -0.313 -0.649*** -0.687*** -0.601***
2: professionals -0.221** -0.326*** -0.354*** -0.312***
3: Technicians and associate professionals -0.452*** -0.393** -0.424*** -0.373**
4: Clerks -0.092 -0.170* -0.210** -0.116
5: Service workers and shop and market sales workers -0.160*** -0.139* -0.153** -0.116
6: Skilled agricultural and fishery workers -0.085 -0.138 -0.121 -0.032
7: Craft and related trades workers -0.181*** -0.133 -0.157** -0.107
8: Plant and machine operators and assemblers -0.253*** -0.219** -0.270** -0.195**
Missing values -0.863 0.347 -0.569 0.448*
Experience with computer at work (ref. Do not use ICT at work) 
Use of ICT at work -0.320*** -0.354*** -0.327*** -0.409***
Missing values 0.506 -0.646 -0.944 -0.239
Type of employment contract (ref. indefinite )
Temporary 1.102*** 1.377*** 1.331*** 1.406***
Others: temporary employment agency contract; apprentice        0.876*** 1.269*** 1.137*** 1.291***
Missing values 0.899*** 1.085** 0.944* 0.899
Hours worked per week -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003
Multilevel logistic regression
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Table A3 (continued). Multilevel logistic regression estimates for coefficients  
attached to control variables 
  
Source: First and second rounds PIAAC (2012 and 2015), OECD. 
Coverage: These calculations include all participating countries and take into consideration those who have worked a 
paid job as employees during the last 12 months preceding the survey, excluding youths aged 16-24 in initial cycle of 
studies and retired people at State pension age. 
Notes: Significant at 1% ***, 5% ** and 10% *. This table shows estimates of the coefficients attached to the control 
variables as a complement to the results presented in Tables 5 and 6. Model 1 does not include any country-level 
variables. Model 2 to 4 include economic factors and their interactions to the different types of work organisation. In 
addition to these variables, Model 2 considers labour market policy variables, while Model 3 includes employment 
protection legislation variables and Model 4 takes into account of the wage bargaining system. 
 
 
 
 
Logistic regression
Model 1 Model 2a Model 2b Model 3
Fixed effects estimates
Socio-demographic characteristics
Age in 10 year bands (ref. under 24)
25-34 -0.261*** -0.152** -0.159** -0.134*
35-44 -0.436*** -0.360*** -0.346*** -0.337***
45-54 -0.560*** -0.506*** -0.466*** -0.474***
55 plus -0.377 -0.136 -0.102 -0.107
Education level (ref. primary or less )
Secondary -0.308** -0.168* -0.195** -0.178*
University -0.337*** -0.216* -0.233** -0.217*
Missing values -0.373 0.027 -0.012 -0.285
Gender (ref. male)
female 0.438*** 0.357*** 0.411*** 0.354***
Marital status (ref. living with spouse or partner)
Single 0.122* 0.078 0.088 0.073
Missing values 0.153 0.150 0.132 0.148
Family responsibilities: Number of children (ref. no children)
One child 0.015 -0.027 -0.051 -0.050
Two children -0.222** -0.200 -0.260** -0.212
Three children or more -0.058 -0.182 -0.219* -0.199
Social background (ref. Non 1st or 2nd generation immigrant and Educated parents )
First generation immigrant 0.186 0.053* 0.056* 0.031
second generation immigrant 0.344** 0.226* 0.221* 0.196
Missing values -1.156*** -0.512 -0.517 -0.509
Uneducated parents -0.117*** -0.107*** -0.135*** -0.102**
Missing values 0.049 0.022 0.009 0.051
Number of observations level 1 89705 78439 78985 80317
Number of observations level 2 28 23 24 24
-2 Log Pseudo-Likelihood 3.0089E8 2.3121E8 2.4958E8 2.2601E8
Multilevel logistic regression
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